I read a rather short article on why it's a good idea to read the first two chapters of the Science of Logic before attempting the Phenomenology so I'm simply going to write out notes (and copy the body of text verbatim) on these two chapters alone for my own reference.
Being, pure being - without further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself and also not unequal with respect to another; it has no difference within it, nor any outwardly. If any determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or if it were posited by this determination or content as distinct from another, it would thereby fail to hold fast to its purity. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. - There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure empty intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or, it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate is in fact nothing, neither more nor less than nothing.
Nothing, pure nothingness; it is simple equality with istelf, complete emptiness, complete absence of determination and content; lack of all distinction within. - In so far as mention can be made here of intuiting and thinking, it makes a difference whether something or nothing is being intuited or thought. To intuit or to think nothing has therefore a meaning; the two are distinguished and so nothing is (concretely exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is the empty intuiting and thinking itself, like pure being. - Nothing is therefore the same determination or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as what pure being is.
[This section is composed of 3 subsections, the majority of the text occuring within the first subsection, elucidated by four remarks for further clarification. The second subsection is itself alone and the third is composed of one elucidating remark. Unlike the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel outright specifies which thinkers and which texts he's referring to. Primarily Kant, Jacobi, a little Parmenides, Heraclitus, and short references to what he calls Oriental
thinkers, primarily Indian traditions. To organize it a little bit better for myself I'm going to put the remarks after the 3 main subsections and then follow with the remarks properly labeled.]
Pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same. The truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being - has passed over,
not passes over. But the truth is just as much that they are not without distinction; it is rather that they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct yet equally unseparated and inseparable, and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has just as immediately dissolved itself.
Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity that abstracts from being and nothing; as the unity of being and nothing it is rather this determinate unity, or one in which being and nothing equally are.